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ABSTRACT
Interest is booming in the so-called Internet of Things (IoT).
The Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) is one application of this
trend and involves the use of smart technologies in a manufacturing context. Even though these applications hold the promise
to revolutionize manufacturing, there are a number of outstanding cybersecurity and data privacy issues impacting the realization of the myriad benefits promised by IIoT proponents. This article analyzes some of these pressing issues, focusing on: (1)
critical infrastructure protection and cybersecurity due diligence,
(2) trends in transatlantic data privacy protections, and (3) the
regulation of new technologies like artificial intelligence (AI) and
blockchain. The aticle concludes with a list of recommendations
for state and federal policymakers to consider in an effort to
harden the IIoT along with the supply chains critical to the continued development of smart factories.
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Ubiquitous computing names the third wave in computing, just
now beginning. First were mainframes, each shared by lots of
people. Now we are in the personal computing era, person and
machine staring uneasily at each other across the desktop. Next
comes ubiquitous computing, or the age of calm technology, when
technology recedes into the background of our lives.
- Mark Weiser,1 1996
INTRODUCTION
In 2015, for only the second time in history at that point, a
cyberattack was confirmed to have caused physical damage.2
The first such episode was Stuxnet.3 This time, the target was
not Iran’s nuclear program, but a steel mill in Germany.
Specifically, a blast furnace was compromised causing
“‘massive’—though unspecified—damage.”4 Attackers had
gained access to the plant through the firm’s business network,
highlighting the insecurity that can stem from interconnected
systems even when a firewall is in place.5 There have been
unconfirmed reports of similar incidents, such as one involving
a petrochemical factory that was compromised by a coffee
maker.6 This issue is coming to the fore with the expansion of
Internet-connected devices in the manufacturing sector. These

1. Personal website of Mark Weiser, UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING (Mar. 17,
1996,
8:00
PM),
http://www.ubiq.com/hypertext/weiser/UbiHome.html
[https://web.archive.org/web/20170214230140/http://www.ubiq.com/hypertext
/weiser/UbiHome.html].
2. See Kim Zetter, A Cyberattack Has Caused Confirmed Physical Damage
for the Second Time Ever, WIRED (Jan. 8, 2015, 5:30 AM),
https://www.wired.com/2015/01/german-steel-mill-hack-destruction/
[https://perma.cc/4M49-2HTY] (describing a cyber attack on an unnamed
German steel mill).
3. See Kim Zetter, An Unprecedented Look at Stuxnet, the World’s First
Digital Weapon, WIRED (Nov. 3, 2014, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2014
/11/countdown-to-zero-day-stuxnet/ [https://perma.cc/P5L3-LXCY] (describing
the Stuxnet cyber attack on Iranian uranium enrichment centrifuges).
4. See Zetter, supra note 2.
5. Id.
6. See C10H15N1, How the Coffee-Machine Took down a Factories Control
Room, REDDIT (July 22, 2017, 11:39:47 AM), https://www.reddit.com
/r/talesfromtechsupport/comments/6ovy0h/how_the_coffeemachine_took_down
_a_factories/ [https://perma.cc/86MP-NKRV] (describing a ransomware attack
on wifi-enabled coffee machines, which spread to the factory control systems).
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devices promise new efficiencies and innovations while also
introducing new vulnerabilities.7
The Internet of Things (IoT) underscores the notion of a
hyper-connected future.8 As one example, McKinsey Consulting
has estimated the economic impact of the Internet of Things, or
what may be more accurately described as the “Network of
Things,”9 at $6.2 trillion by 2025.10 The Industrial Internet of
Things (IIoT), sometimes also called the “Factory of Things,” or
“Smart Factory Wave,” involves the use of IoT technologies in
manufacturing applications.11 It holds the promise to
revolutionize manufacturing, including in the fields of “factory
health, digital thread, and smart products.”12 Already, a number
of industrial control systems (ICS) manufacturers, such as
Rockwell Automation, are offering a range of IIoT products from
programmable controllers and industrial sensors to distributed

7. These include distributed denial of service attacks and botnets such as
Mirai. See generally, Constantinos Kolias et al., DDoS in the IoT: Mirai and
Other Botnets, 50 IEEE COMPUTER 80 (2017) (warning that the ubiquity of
internet-connected devices provides a large and vulnerable platform that can be
exploited by botnets to amplify cyberattacks).
8. See generally Scott J. Shackelford et al., When Toasters Attack: A
Polycentric Approach to Enhancing the “Security of Things,” 2017 U. ILL L. REV.
415 (2017) (explaining the Internet of Things and associated challenges); see
also Scott J. Shackelford & Scott Bradner, Have You Updated Your Toaster?
Transatlantic Approaches to Governing the Internet of Everything, (Kelley Sch.
of Bus., Res. Paper No. 18-60), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=3208018.
9. See generally Bernardo A. Huberman, Ensuring Trust and Security in
(Jan.
2016)
the
Industrial
IoT,
UBIQUITY,
https://ubiquity.acm.org/article.cfm?id=2822883 (describing the Internet of
Things as a “network of small sensors that enables precise control and
monitoring of complex processes over arbitrary distances.”).
10. Chunka Mui, Thinking Big About the Industrial Internet of Things,
FORBES (Mar. 4, 2016, 10:03 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/chunkamui
/2016/03/04/thinking-big-about-industrial-iot/#7f1e54066220
[https://perma.cc/CHX5-QFFX].
11. See Richard D. Taylor, The Next Stage of U.S. Communications Policy:
The Emerging Embedded Infosphere, 41 TELECOMM. POL’Y 1039, 1039 (2017)
(“The United States needs to reimagine the basic principles of its
telecommunications and information policy to fit an emerging society in which
networking and intelligence are embedded into an increasing number of
everyday things which constantly monitor and measure our lives. This
emerging environment is an always-on, ubiquitous, integrated system
comprised of the Internet of Things, Big Data, Artificial Intelligence/Intelligent
Systems and the Intercloud, which act together as a single system, referred to
here as the ‘Embedded Infosphere’ (EI).”).
12. See Mui, supra note 10.
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control systems.13 However, while such products promote
efficiency, they also increase the attack surface and with it the
cyber risk that manufacturers must manage.14
Numerous outstanding cybersecurity and data privacy
issues impact the realization of the myriad benefits promised by
IIoT, including the use of personal data in factory settings.15 Yet,
to date, there has been a paucity of literature on the topic.16 This

13. See Product Offerings, Rockwell Automation, https://www
.rockwellautomation.com/en_NA/products/overview.page (last visited Dec. 20,
2019).
14. See Bob Tarzey, The Ever-Growing IoT Attack Surface, COMPUTER
WEEKLY: QUOCIRCA INSIGHTS (July 6, 2017, 8:56 AM), https://www.
computerweekly.com/blog/Quocirca-Insights/The-ever-growing-IoT-attack
-surface [https://perma.cc/928Z-GP9S] (discussing IoT vulnerabilities).
15. See, e.g., Randy Vogenberg et al., Personalized Medicine, 35 PHARMACY
& THERAPEUTICS 624 (2010) (describing the application of this concept in the
personalized medicine movement and discussing the fact that high-risk
personal data is typically not covered under HIPAA).
16. Cf. Charles J. Barnes, Smart Home Alone: The World’s Gateway to More
Efficient Use of Energy and Mayhem, 5 LSU J. OF ENERGY L. & RESOURCES 365,
368 (2017) (“Industry leaders and Smart Grid regulators are pushing for greater
interoperability within the Smart Grid. Although greater interoperability
would be beneficial, if unchecked, this policy will lead to a kinetic cyber attack.”)
(footnote omitted); Nikole Davenport, Smart Washers May Clean Your Clothes,
but Hacks Can Clean out Your Privacy, and Underdeveloped Regulations Could
Leave You Hanging on a Line, 32 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L. 259,
262–63 (2016) (“The IoT is a broad concept used colloquially to encompass many
or all of the interconnected devices in our future. But industry experts identify
three subsets to the general IoT category which are the Industrial Internet (i.e.
all interconnected products, sensors, controls, etc., used in industry and
business), the Internet-of-everything (consumer objects and systems that
combine people and data), and the Cyber physical systems (which are the
systems that connect it all).”); Kevin DiGrazia, Cyber Insurance, Data Security,
and Blockchain in the Wake of the Equifax Breach, 13 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 255,
262 (2018) (“Firms purchasing cyber insurance should understand what their
current insurance policies will cover, and what duplicate coverage and peril
gaps exist. With the surge in automation of the IoT and the Industrial Internet
of Things (“[IIoT]”), hackers will increasingly be able to cause physical damage
to machinery and other equipment.”); Stacy-Ann Elvy, Contracting in the Age
of the Internet of Things: Article 2 of the UCC and Beyond, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV.
839, 906 n.367 (2016) (noting that cyber attacks on the Industrial Internet of
Things are increasing); Andrew G. Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the
Fourth Amendment of Effects, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 805, 813 (2016) (“Experts
predict that the worldwide scale of such ‘smart,’ interconnected objects will
continue to grow, reaching more than fifty billion objects in 2020, and one
trillion by 2025. As inexpensive, unobtrusive identifying technology combines
with more sophisticated wireless networks, new possibilities will emerge to
allow tracking of human and nonhuman activity. The result will be additional
options for government surveillance that can reveal the patterns of everyday

6

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 21:1

article analyzes some of these gaps, focusing on: (1) critical
infrastructure protection and cybersecurity due diligence, (2)
trends in transatlantic data privacy protections relevant to
manufacturers, and (3) the regulation of new technologies like
AI and blockchain and their applicability to address IIoT
security and privacy challenges. This article concludes with an
analysis of options available to state and federal policymakers to
help harden IIoT devices and supply chains against cyber
attacks.
I.

CYBERSECURITY AND DATA PRIVACY IIOT HOT
TOPICS

Although there are differing accounts as to the origin story
of the term “Internet of Things,” most accounts point to Kevin
Ashton coining it in the form of a title for a 1999 presentation for
Proctor & Gamble.17 But the idea has been around for longer,
including as pervasive computing, “Ubiquitous Computing,” and
“Real-World Web.”18 Although these terms are not all
analogous,19 it is true that from these humble beginnings has
come a global effort to make our technology, businesses, and

life.”) (footnotes omitted); Dera J. Nevin & Marc Jenkins, Information,
Knowledge, and the Pursuit of Privacy, 38 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 485, 488–89
(2015) (arguing that “‘Big Iron’ companies like General Electric (GE) have
become Big Data technology companies.”); Dalmacio V. Posadas, Jr., After the
Gold Rush: The Boom of the Internet of Things, and the Busts of Data-Security
and Privacy, 28 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 69, 76 (2017) (“On
a larger scale, the so-called Industrial IoT is streamlining industrial production
across the world. However, what remains unclear is the depth and breadth of
how these efficient objects will impact privacy.”) (footnote omitted).
17. See Kevin Ashton, That ‘Internet of Things’ Thing, RFID J. (June 22,
2009), www.rfidjournal.com/articles/view?4986 [https://perma.cc/J638-8KN3]
(describing one possible origin of the term).
18. See Jackie Fenn & Hung LeHong, Hype Cycle for Emerging
Technologies, GARTNER (July 28, 2011), https://www.gartner.com/doc/1754719
/hype-cycle-emerging-technologies (explaining the Gartner “hype cycle.” The
“hype cycle” is a graphical model used by the I.T. firm Gartner to represent
periods of excitement and disillusionment); see Detlef Zuehlke, Smart-Factory:
Towards a Factory-of-Things, 34 ANN. REV. CONTROL 129, 129 (2010) (applying
the concept of “ubiquitous computing”). See also Jennifer S. Winter, Privacy,
Algorithmic Discrimination, and the Internet of Things, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
INFORMATION SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 4951, 4951–52 (Medhi KhosrowPour ed., 2018) (applying the concepts of “ubiquitous computing” and “ambient
intelligence”).
19. See Winter, supra note 18 (discussing the difference between
“ubiquitous computing” and “ambient intelligence.”).
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even our bodies, smart.20 Wherever it came from, the term IoT
today now enjoys widespread use in both technology and policy
circles, as well as in popular culture.21 It includes a constellation
of devices and technologies with built-in wireless connectivity
that “can be monitored, controlled[,] and linked”22 together, as is
represented in Figure 1.

Fig. 1 2016 Gartner IoT ‘Hype Cycle’23
The increasingly hyper-connected network of products and
systems comprising IoT opens up new economic opportunities,

20. See, e.g., Meghan Neal, The Internet of Bodies is Coming, and You
Could Get Hacked, MOTHERBOARD (Mar. 13, 2014, 1:20 PM),
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/gvyqgm/the-internet-of-bodies-iscoming-and-you-could-get-hacked [https://perma.cc/4YN5-GZEJ] (discussing
the effort to augment bodies using implantable technology).
21. See Fenn & LeHong, supra note 18 (discussing contemporary use of the
term “Internet of Things”).
22. Bonnie Cha, A Beginner’s Guide to Understanding the Internet of
Things, RECODE (Jan. 15, 2015, 6:00 AM), https://www.recode.net
/2015/1/15/11557782/a-beginners-guide-to-understanding-the-internet-of
-things [https://perma.cc/6GE2-MC7G].
23. Technologies Underpin the Hype Cycle for the Internet of Things, 2016,
GARTNER (Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.gartner.com/smarterwithgartner
/7-technologies-underpin-the-hype-cycle-for-the-internet-of-things-2016/
(describing the Gartner “hype cycle” for IoT technology).
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along with vulnerabilities.24 Already, though, some of the
excitement may be fading in the wake of well-publicized
vulnerabilities, such as may be seen with smart lightbulbs
already being in the “Trough of Disillusionment” in Figure 1.
This section explores some of the security implications in the
smart factory revolution, what has been called the “fourth
revolution” in this space,25 before moving on to analyzing the
associated policy implications.
A. SMART FACTORIES AND CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
PROTECTION
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security is tasked with
defining and defending these vital industries, which it
subdivides into sixteen sectors.26 These sectors are not fixed; for
example, elections were included under the public facilities

24. See Aaron Tilley, How Hackers Could Use A Nest Thermostat As An
Entry Point Into Your Home, FORBES (Mar. 6, 2015, 6:00 AM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/aarontilley/2015/03/06/nest-thermostat-hack-home
-network/#235d0d693986 [https://perma.cc/9VYV-ECT4]; Carl Franzen, How to
Find a Hack-Proof Baby Monitor, OFFSPRING (Aug. 4, 2017, 6:30 PM),
https://offspring.lifehacker.com/how-to-find-a-hack-proof-baby-monitor1797534985 [https://perma.cc/T9ZQ-QE2X]; Charlie Osborne, Smartwatch
Security Fails to Impress: Top Devices Vulnerable to Cyberattack, ZDNET (July
22, 2015), http://www.zdnet.com/article/smartwatch-security
-fails-to-impress-top-devices-vulnerable-to-cyberattack/; John Markoff, Why
Light Bulbs May Be the Next Hacker Target, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/03/technology/why-light-bulbs-may-be-the
-next-hacker-target.html (providing examples of the threat hackers pose to
smarter tech).
25. Hyoung Seok Kang et al., Smart Manufacturing: Past Research, Present
Findings, and Future Directions, 3 INT’L J. PRECISION ENG’G & MFG.-GREEN
TECH. 111, 118 (2016).
26. See Directive on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, 2013
DAILY COMP. PRES. Doc. 92 (Fed. 12, 2013); Supporting policy and Doctrine,
DHS, (last visited Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.dhs.gov/cisa/supporting-policyand-doctrine [https://perma.cc/R22C-A3WN]; Frequently Asked Questions, (last
visited Dec. 20, 2019) http://web.archive.org/web/20140117082728/http://icscert.us-cert.gov/Frequently-Asked-Questions (describing the U.S. Cyber
Emergency Response Team, which is part of DHS, and identifying sixteen
critical infrastructure sectors consistent with Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 7 including: agriculture, banking and finance, chemical, commercial
facilities, dams, defense industrial base, drinking water and water treatment
systems, emergency systems, energy, government facilities, information
technology, nuclear systems, public health and healthcare, telecommunications,
and transportation systems).
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sector in January 2017.27 Smart factories fall under an array of
critical infrastructure sectors, including the critical
manufacturing sector itself (which comprises electrical
equipment and appliances along with transportation) along with
the communications, healthcare, and even the defense industrial
base. As such, firms operating in this space should be aware of
the possibility for substantial federal oversight, such as would
have been required under the Cybersecurity Act of 2012.28 Each
of these sixteen sectors boasts an Information Sharing and
Analysis Center (ISAC) to help spread cyber threat information,
along with awareness as to best practices.29 Efforts have also
been made to break down silos between sectors, such as through
Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations (ISAOs).30
Such public-private bi-directional information sharing between
the critical infrastructure sectors will be essential to defending
the IIoT, including both information technology (IT) (e.g.,
business systems) and operations technology (OT) that cover
those systems in the manufacturing environment.31 The latter
distinction is important since IT efforts typically prioritize their
focus on confidentiality, integrity and then availability, while
OT efforts place the highest priority on availability.

27. See Statement by Secretary Jeh Johnson on the Designation of Election
Infrastructure as a Critical Infrastructure Subsector, DEP’T HOMELAND SEC.
(Jan. 6, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/01/06/statement-secretary
-johnson-designation-election-infrastructure-critical (designating “election
infrastructure” as a critical infrastructure subsector).
28. See Scott J. Shackelford, In Search of Cyber Peace: A Response to the
Cybersecurity Act of 2012, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 106 (Mar. 8, 2012),
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/cyber-peace (responding to the
Cybersecurity Act of 2012).
29. E.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., CHEMICAL-SECTOR SPECIFIC PLAN
(2015) (“The sector is currently pilot testing an Information Sharing and
Analysis Center (ISAC) to facilitate the dissemination of cyber threat data
between DHS, other government agencies, and the Chemical Sector.”).
30. See generally Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations
(ISAOs), U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/cisa/information
-sharing-and-analysis-organizations-isaos [https://perma.cc/2YGZ-Z9HZ] (last
visited Sept. 21, 2019) (providing a general overview of Information Sharing
and Analysis Organizations).
31. See Amanda Ziadeh, Homeland Security is Building Collective Defense
Against Adversaries, GOVT. CIO MEDIA (July 20, 2018, 3:57 PM),
https://www.governmentciomedia.com/homeland-security-building-collective
-defense-against-adversaries [https://perma.cc/ZNN5-FBTH] (advocating a
joint effort between the government and the private sector to better combat
cyber threats).
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Compounding the challenge is that most existing OT systems do
not have the capacity to add cybersecurity protections without
negatively impacting production. This fact will be all the more
important as threats to smart factories proliferate.
1. Threats from Foreign Nation-States and Economic
Espionage Campaigns
In March 2018, the FBI and DHS jointly accused the
Russian government of a “multi-stage intrusion campaign”
targeting the U.S. power grid along with compromising the
industrial control systems of several “small commercial
facilities.”32 This episode is just one data point in a long history
of cyber attacks on U.S. critical infrastructure with links to
Russia.33 The United States is far from alone. For example,
Ukraine experienced waves of attacks including “the first-ever
confirmed cyberattack against grid infrastructure.”34 Russia is
not alone in its online aggression either, with the list of cyber
powers growing to more than fifty nations, not to mention
sophisticated criminal organizations, firms, and hacktivists.35
Iran, for example, has reportedly readied a wave of cyber attacks

32. Taylor Hatmaker, DHS and FBI Detail How Russia Is Hacking into
U.S. Nuclear Facilities and Other Critical Infrastructure, TECHCRUNCH (Mar.
15, 2018, 3:54 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2018/03/15/russia-energy-hack-dhs
-fbi-us-cert/ [https://perma.cc/C9DC-HT74].
33. See OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, JOINT DHS, ODNI,
FBI STATEMENT ON RUSSIAN MALICIOUS CYBER ACTIVITY (Dec. 29, 2016)
https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/joint-dhs-odni-fbi-statement
-on-russian-malicious-cyber-activity (detailing Russian efforts to cyber attack
the U.S. government and its citizens).
34. Jeff St. John, The Real Cybersecurity Issues Behind the Overhyped
(Jan. 4, 2017),
‘Russia
Hacks
the
Grid’
Story, GREENTECH
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/the-real-cybersecurity-issues
-behind-the-overhyped-russia-hacks-the-grid-st
[https://perma.cc/6GGNGFVQ].
35. E.g., Keth Breene, Who Are the Cyberwar Superpowers?, WORLD ECON.
F. (May 4, 2016), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/05/who-are-thecyberwar-superpowers/ [https://perma.cc/2NJY-38UG] (one list of potential
nations designated as “cyber superpowers”); Elvis Plesky, Top Hacking Groups
(July
3,
2018),
Impacting
Cybersecurity
Today,
PLESK
https://www.plesk.com/blog/business-industry/top-hacking-groupscybersecurity-today/ (listing various hacking groups and their histories);
Shannon Vavra, The World’s Top Cyber Powers, AXIOS (Aug. 13, 2017),
https://www.axios.com/the-worlds-top-cyber-powers-1513304669-4fa53675b7e6-4276-a2bf-4a84b4986fe9.html [https://perma.cc/DC7W-ZVKX] (listing the
world’s top cyberpowers and the types of attacks they are capable of launching).
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against critical infrastructure in response to the United States’
withdrawal from the Iran nuclear agreement.36
Yet the threat of cyber conflict is also only one facet in the
multi-faceted cyber risk facing smart factories. Another facet is
the continued prevalence of trade secrets theft, even after the
U.S.-China 2015 Cybersecurity Code of Conduct, which was
designed to safeguard commercial intellectual property and was
prompted in part by hackers targeting U.S. Steel.37 The rise of
IIoT generally, and smart factories in particular, has expanded
the threat surface against which manufacturers will have to
protect their systems and property, necessitating advances in
cybersecurity due diligence. In one demonstration, for example,
a single compromised wireless webcam was able to “jam all
wireless communication and thereby stop production” at a
factory.38 Other threats are numerous and can emanate from an
array of actors such as criminal organizations, terrorist groups,
insider threats, and intellectual property thieves.39
2. Meaning of “Cybersecurity Due Diligence” for Smart
Factories
“Due diligence” has a multitude of meanings depending on
the context, nation, and sector involved.40 In the transactional

36. See Courtney Kube et al., Iran has Laid Groundwork for Extensive
Cyberattacks on U.S., Say Officials, NBC NEWS (July 20, 2018, 10:50 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/iran-has-laid-groundwork-extensive
-cyberattacks-u-s-say-officials-n893081
[https://perma.cc/W8VR-W49Q]
(“Iranian hackers have laid the groundwork to carry out extensive cyberattacks
on U.S. and European infrastructure and on private companies . . . .”).
37. See Gary Brown & Christopher D. Yung, Evaluating the US-China
Cybersecurity Agreement, Part I: The US Approach to Cyberspace, DIPLOMAT
(Jan.
19,
2017),
https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/evaluating-the-us
-china-cybersecurity-agreement-part-1-the-us-approach-to-cyberspace/; Colin
Hanna, China Stonewalls U. S. Steel’s Cybertheft Lawsuit, INVESTOR’S
BUSINESS
DAILY
(Mar.
27,
2017),
https://
www.investors.com/politics/commentary/china-stonewalls-u-s-steels-cyber
-theft-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/2EFJ-3WRR].
38. Zuehlke, supra note 18, at 136.
39. See generally Scott J. Shackelford et al., Using BITs to Protect Bytes:
Promoting Cyber Peace by Safeguarding Trade Secrets Through Bilateral
Investment Treaties, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 12–13 (2015) (detailing potential cyber
threats to trade secrets).
40. See, e.g., Scott J. Shackelford et al., Unpacking the International Law
on Cybersecurity Due Diligence: Lessons from the Public and Private Sectors. 17
Chi. J. Int’l L. 1, 7–20 (2016) (discussing different standards of cybersecurity
due diligence in caselaw).
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context, cybersecurity due diligence has been defined as “the
review of the governance, processes, and controls that are used
to secure information assets.”41 This broad understanding builds
from the corporate, national, and international obligations of
both state and non-state actors to help identify and instill
cybersecurity best practices across a range of actors.42 Such a
broad, multidisciplinary understanding of this concept is vital in
the IoT context in particular, given the extent to which networks
and systems interact. Here, cybersecurity due diligence is
centered on identifying and spreading risk management best
practices between State and non-State actors, so as to promote
security in smart manufacturing. One illustration is the
Governance, Risk, and Compliance (GRC) Framework, which
considers the “capabilities that integrate the governance,
management and assurance of performance, risk, and
compliance activities” across an organization.43 The question
becomes how manufacturers can fulfill GRC responsibilities,
which include not just protecting technical infrastructure, but
also safeguarding trade secrets and sensitive personal data that
may be subject to big data analytics and deep learning. The next
section discusses this topic.44

41. Tim Ryan & Leonard Navarro, Cyber Due Diligence: Pre-Transaction
Assessments Can Uncover Costly Risks, KROLL (Jan. 28, 2015),
https://www.kroll.com/en/insights/publications/cyber/cyber-due-diligence-pre
-transaction-assessments [https://perma.cc/AW3X-Z43H].
42. See generally Scott J. Shackelford, The Meaning of Cyber Peace, NOTRE
DAME INST. ADV. STUDY Q. (2013), https://ndias.nd.edu/news-publications
/ndias-quarterly/the-meaning-of-cyber-peace/ (discussing the concept of “cyber
peace” and the role that state and non-state actors play in maintaining cyber
peace).
43. What is GRC?, OCEG, https://www.oceg.org/about/what-is-grc/
[https://perma.cc/X47X-289D] (last visited Nov. 27, 2019).
44. In general, data privacy policies are needed to cover proprietary
manufacturing data generated by the IIoT. Such data may range from the code
that runs machines to the output of sensors that measure recipe amounts and
composition. There are a number of situations where such data may be captured
and aggregated by supply chain partners, equipment manufacturers, and
others. The lack of a clear delineation of ownership is an impediment for
companies to connect their IIoT systems to each other, reducing the benefits of
digital manufacturing.
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3. Federal Cybersecurity Frameworks and Standards
Impacting Smart Factories
Two of the main efforts aimed at defining cybersecurity due
diligence that are most relevant to the smart factory context are
the National Institute of Standards and Technology
Cybersecurity Framework (NIST CSF) and the Federal Trade
Commission’s (FTC) guidance.45 The NIST CSF was born from
President Obama’s efforts to empower NIST to partner with
industry and develop a framework comprised of private-sector
cybersecurity best practices that would help inform an array of
organizations in their cybersecurity decision-making processes,
but particularly those operating critical infrastructure.46 The
result was the first NIST CSF, in 2014. While critics have
complained about the framework’s reactive stance,47 it
nevertheless is helping to define cybersecurity due diligence in
the United States.48 The NIST CSF takes manufacturing
concerns into account; indeed, NIST deserves credit for focusing
its efforts on improving cybersecurity due diligence in factories,
as seen in its published Cybersecurity Framework
Manufacturing Profile that is “a roadmap for reducing

45. See NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., IMPROVING CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY EXEC. ORDER 13636: PRELIMINARY
CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK 1 (2013).
46. See NIST Marks Fifth Anniversary of Popular Cybersecurity
Framework, NIST (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news
/2019/02/nist-marks-fifth-anniversary-popular-cybersecurity-framework
[https://perma.cc/PQ5R-2HLH].
47. See, e.g., Taylor Armerding, NIST’s Finalized Cybersecurity Framework
Receives
Mixed
Reviews,
CSO
(Jan.
31,
2014),
http://www.csoonline.com/article/2134338/security-leadership/nist-s-finalized
-cybersecurity-framework-receives-mixed-reviews.html
[https://perma.cc/W9C4-7WL2] (describing a critique of the NIST CSF as being
backward-looking, rather than forward-looking).
48. See, e.g., Scott J. Shackelford et al., Toward a Global Standard of
Cybersecurity Care?: Exploring the Implications of the 2014 Cybersecurity
Framework on Shaping Reasonable National and International Cybersecurity
Practices, 50 TEX. J. INT’L L. 287 (2015) (analyzing the impact of the
Cybersecurity Framework on domestic industry and the international
landscape); Scott J. Shackelford, Scott Russell, & Andreas Kuehn, Unpacking
the International Law on Cybersecurity Due Diligence: Lessons from the Public
and Private Sectors, 17 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (2016) (arguing for a “proactive
regime” in the public and private sector that draws off the NIST framework).
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cybersecurity risk for manufacturers.”49 Rather than replace
security policies already in effect, NIST intends these
“voluntary, risk-based” efforts to enhance existing commitments
and support organizations in their efforts to “identify,
implement, and improve cybersecurity practices, and create[] a
common language for internal and external communication of
cybersecurity issues.”50 The original NIST CSF was voluntary,51
but advocates have increasingly made the case that if an
organization’s “cybersecurity practices were ever questioned
during litigation or a regulatory investigation, the ‘standard’ for
‘due diligence’ was now the NIST [CSF].”52 While it was
originally published in 2014, NIST has remained engaged in this
space,53 as seen in the development of the 2018 NIST Privacy
Framework,54 and the 2016 NIST CSF for small businesses,55 all
of which are important data points for boosting cybersecurity
and privacy due diligence in the smart manufacturing context.
The NIST CSF not only has the potential to gradually shape
a standard of care for domestic manufacturing, but also could
help to harmonize global cybersecurity best practices for given
active NIST collaborations with more than twenty nations

49. KEITH A. STOUFFER ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH.,
CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK MANUFACTURING PROFILE, NISTIR 8183 (2017),
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8183.
50. Why You Should Adopt the NIST Framework 1, PWC (May 2014),
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/increasing-it-effectiveness/publications/assets
/adopt-the-nist.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RFW-4MEM].
51. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY (2015), available at https://
www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cyberframework/cybersecurityframework-021214.pdf.
52. John Verry, Why the NIST Cybersecurity Framework Isn’t Really
POINT
SECURITY:
BLOG
(Feb.
25,
2014),
Voluntary,
PIVOT
https://www.pivotpointsecurity.com/blog/nist-cybersecurity-framework
[https://perma.cc/DW4R-EKBT] (discussing guidance given to Municipal Utility
Districts).
53. See, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH, NIST RELEASES VERSION
1.1 OF ITS POPULAR CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK (Apr. 16, 2018), https://
www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2018/04/nist-releases-version-11-its-popular
-cybersecurity-framework [https://perma.cc/77XX-FGG9] (announcing the
release of updated standards based on user feedback).
54. Developing a Privacy Framework, 83 Fed. Reg. 56824 (Nov. 14, 2018)
(requesting comment on proposed updates to the privacy framework).
55. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., SMALL BUSINESS INFORMATION
SECURITY: THE FUNDAMENTALS (2016), https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir
/2016/NIST.IR.7621r1.pdf.
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including the United Kingdom, Japan, South Korea, Israel, and
Germany.56 Such a global push is particularly important in the
manufacturing sector given the extent to which supply chains
straddle jurisdictions, and even continents.57 Progress toward
further defining baseline cybersecurity due diligence in the
manufacturing context has continued with the publication of
Version 1.1 of the NIST CSF in April 2018, which, as Secretary
of Commerce Wilbur Ross has argued “should be every
company’s first line of defense.”58 The new version boasts
significant improvements, including modernized policies
regarding authentication, supply chain cybersecurity, and
vulnerability disclosure.59 Yet, the NIST CSF is still best
considered a cybersecurity floor rather than a ceiling. It does not,
for example, focus on IoT issues in particular, which is an area
that many would like NIST to address in more detail as is
discussed further below.
Similar to NIST, commentators have made the case that the
FTC suggests “tackling data security and all consumer-facing
software development efforts with a holistic approach that
incorporates a ‘privacy by design’ strategy to address the entire
life cycle of data collection, use, access, storage and ultimately
secure data deletion.”60 In particular, the FTC suggests keeping
software updated, encrypting sensitive data, using multi-factor
authentication, and having an updated incident response plan.61

56. The FTC’s enforcement powers may already be facilitating the
development of these best practices. See, e.g., Brian Fung, A Court Just Made
It Easier for the Government to Sue Companies for Getting Hacked, WASH. POST
(Aug.
24,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theswitch/wp/2015/08/24/a-court-just-made-it-easier-for-the-government-to-sue
-companies-for-getting-hacked/.
57. See, e.g., Maria Korolov, What Is a Supply Chain Attack? Why You
Should Be Wary of Third-Party Providers, CSO (Apr. 4, 2018, 8:15 AM),
https://www.csoonline.com/article/3191947/data-breach/what-is-a-supply
-chain-attack-why-you-should-be-wary-of-third-party-providers.html
[https://perma.cc/DP24-QV5Q]; Warwick Ashford, Most Businesses Vulnerable
to Supply Chain Cyber Attacks, COMPUT. WEEKLY (Apr. 30, 2019, 11:30 AM),
https://www.computerweekly.com/news/252462476/Most-businesses
-vulnerable-to-supply-chain-cyber-attacks [https://perma.cc/MH2P-FSPA].
58. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., supra note 53.
59. Id.
60. FTC Enters “Internet of Things” Arena with TRENDnet Proposed
Settlement, INFO. L. GP. (Sept. 9, 2013), http://www.infolawgroup.com/blog
/2013/09/articles/ftc/trendnet-settlement/.
61. See Cybersecurity Basics, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips
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The FTC is able to give such suggestions binding legal force
thanks to Section Five of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
which established the FTC and empowers it to police “unfair or
deceptive acts or practices.”62 The FTC has wielded this
authority to penalize firms for lax privacy and cybersecurity
standards.63 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit upheld the FTC’s power in this regard in 2015 in FTC v.
Wyndham Worldwide.64 However, a 2018 case, LabMD Inc. v.
Federal Trade Commission, underscored a potential growing
circuit split involving the FTC, which may require it to be more
specific in the cybersecurity requirements it places on
businesses.65 This could include requiring more firms to take
measures that so far the FTC has only encouraged on a
voluntary basis, including:
* [B]uild security into devices at the outset, rather than as an afterthought in the design process;
* [T]rain employees about the importance of security, and ensure
that security is managed at an appropriate level in the organization;
* [E]nsure that when outside service providers are hired, that those
providers are capable of maintaining reasonable security, and provide
reasonable oversight of the providers;
* [W]hen a security risk is identified, consider a “defense-in-depth”
strategy whereby multiple layers of security may be used to defend
against a particular risk;

-advice/business-center/small-businesses/cybersecurity/basics (last visited Nov.
10, 2019) (encouraging small business owners to adopt the listed practices).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 45; See also A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade
Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority, FED. TRADE
COMM’N (2008), https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement
-authority (describing the ability of the FTC to investigate and enforce as
necessary).
63. See Privacy & Data Security Update: 2018, FED. TRADE COMM’N (2018),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/ files/documents/reports/privacy-data-security
-update-2018/2018-privacy-data-security-report-508.pdf (describing recent
enforcement actions brought by the FTC).
64. FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 248–249 (3rd Cir.
2015). See also W. Reece Hirsch & Rahul Kapoor, Third Circuit Sides with FTC
in Data Security with Wyndham, NAT’L L. REV. (Sept. 8, 2015),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/third-circuit-sides-ftc-data-security
-dispute-wyndham.
65. LabMD, Inc. v. FTC, 894 F.3d 1221, 1237 (11th Cir. 2018) (finding an
FTC cease and desist order unenforceable for failing to enjoin “a specific act or
practice” and requiring the business in question improve its “data security
program to meet an indeterminable standard of reasonableness.”).
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* [C]onsider measures to keep unauthorized users from accessing a
consumer’s device, data, or personal information stored on the network;
* [M]onitor connected devices throughout their expected life cycle,
and where feasible, provide security patches to cover known risks.66

However, due to complex supply chains and a global
customer base, U.S. federal IoT regulations are by no means the
only ones IIoT proponents must consider. The next section
considers the impact of the State of California’s recent efforts
before moving on to discuss the European Union’s regulatory
efforts at cybersecurity and data privacy in the smart
manufacturing sector.
4. State-Level IIoT Policy: California Case Study
California’s 2018 Consumer Privacy Act is helping set a new
standard for U.S. Privacy protections, following in the footsteps
of its groundbreaking 2002 privacy law that ushered in the first
data breach notification standards.67 This latter idea has since
been copied by the other 49 states68 and the European Union69
as is discussed further in the next subsection. Although the 2018
Privacy Act70 does not go quite as far as the European Union’s
new General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)71 discussed
below, it does include provisions that allow consumers to sue
over data breaches, and obtain information about how their data
is being gathered and used by companies to make more informed
decisions.72 Although there remains debate about the scope and

66. FTC Report on Internet of Things Urges Companies to Adopt Best
Practices to Address Consumer Privacy and Security Risks, FED. TRADE COMM’N
(Jan. 27, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/01/ftc
-report-internet-things-urges-companies-adopt-best-practices.
67. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1798.29, 1798.82 (Deering 2002).
68. Computer Crime Statutes, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information
-technology/computer-hacking-and-unauthorized-access-laws.aspx#Hacking
(last updated June 14, 2018).
69. See Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 85, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1.
70. California Consumer Privacy Act 2018, Cal. Civ. Code §§1798.100–.199
(Deering 2019).
71. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 1, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1.
72. See Ben Adler, California Passes Strict Internet Privacy Law with
Implications for the Country, NPR (June 29, 2018) https://www.npr.org
/2018/06/29/624336039/california-passes-strict-internet-privacy-law-withimplications-for-the-country [https://perma.cc/U3RG-STY9] (describing the
privacy implications of the law).
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effectiveness of this intervention,73 the law may well help shape
the cybersecurity practices of the manufacturing base in
California along with their business partners, such as by
requiring added efforts to protect the privacy rights of
consumers and suppliers.74
This law builds on California’s existing IoT policies. One of
these relevant efforts dates back to 2016, when California
expanded its definition of the term “personal information” to
include “a person’s name in combination with his or her Social
Security number, driver’s license or [state] identification card,
credit or debit card number and password, or medical
information.”75 This definition is still narrower than that
applicable in the EU under the GDPR—where even a person’s
IP address is considered Personally Identifiable Information
(PII)—but it should be considered a step in that direction.76 In
addition, California law requires “companies that share such
information to not only take extra security precautions
themselves when managing the information, but to ensure that
any entities they share information with also abide by strict
security measures.”77 Indeed, in practical effect, this regulation
requires covered firms to include “contractual provisions
mandating implementation of reasonable security measures.”78
This requirement could have an even greater impact on
cybersecurity due diligence overall given the size of California’s

73. See Jeff Kosseff, Ten Reasons Why California’s New Data Protection
Law is Unworkable, Burdensome, and Possibly Unconstitutional (Guest Blog
Post), TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (July 9, 2018), https://blog.ericgoldman.org
/archives/2018/07/ten-reasons-why-californias-new-data-protection-law-isunworkable-burdensome-and-possibly-unconstitutional-guest-blog-post.htm
[https://perma.cc/959C-RN24] (summarizing regulatory and constitutional
issues concerning with the new California data protection law).
74. See, e.g., California Consumer Privacy Act 2018, Cal. Civ. Code §
1798.100(a) (Deering 2019) (“A consumer shall have the right to request that a
business that collects a consumer’s personal information disclose to that
consumer the categories and specific pieces of personal information the business
has collected.”).
75. Dan Cook, New Privacy Regs in CA, NV Tighten Security Measures,
BENEFITSPRO (Aug. 12, 2015), https://www.benefitspro.com/2015/08/12/new
-privacy-regs-in-ca-nv-tighten-security-measure.
76. See
What
is
Personal
Data?,
EU GDPR COMPLIANT,
https://eugdprcompliant.com/personal-data/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2019).
77. Cook, supra note 75.
78. Id.
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economy—which is bigger than the UK’s as of 2018.79
California’s regulatory regime could further promote the global
acceptance of both the NIST CSF and the FTC cybersecurity
efforts discussed above.
B. TRANSATLANTIC APPROACHES TO DATA PRIVACY IN THE
INDUSTRIAL IOT CONTEXT
As discussed above, the cybersecurity and data privacy
regime within the United States is sector-specific. In contrast,
the European Union has taken a distinct and far more
regulatory and comprehensive approach.80 Examples include the
2018 passage of the Network Information Security (NIS)
Directive, and the enactment of the GDPR, both of which are
explored in this section. The EU approach is not without its
critics, such as those who are concerned about overcentralization,81 but it is equally true that these efforts have
made the EU a global leader in information governance best
practices.82 Moreover, transatlantic approaches to how
organizations should manage their cyber risk are converging
around the language of risk management. The EU’s Network

79. See Lisa M. Segarra, California’s Economy Is Now Bigger Than All of
the U.K., FORTUNE (May 5, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/05/05/california-fifth
-biggest-economy-passes-united-kingdom/.
80. See, e.g., Scott J. Shackelford, Seeking a Safe Harbor in a Widening Sea:
Unpacking the EJC’s Schrems Decision and What it Means for Transatlantic
Relations, SETON HALL J. OF DIPLOMACY & INT’L REL. (forthcoming 2018)
(discussing the differences between EU and US stances on internet governance
through an analysis of the decision in Schrems v. Data Protection
Commissioner, ECJ Judgment in Case C-362/14 (2015) (Eur.)).
81. Response to EU Cybersecurity Strategy and Proposed Directive on
Network and Information Security (NIS), DIGITALEUROPE (Feb. 7, 2013),
http://pr.euractiv.com/pr/response-eu-cybersecurity-strategy-and-proposed
-directive-network-and-information-security-nis (“Member States are building
communities and trust through local, regional, or sector specific private public
partnerships, yet we see a general change in approach in the draft Network and
Information Security Directive from working hand-in-hand with industry, to
top-down, unidirectional reporting obligations and requirements.”).
82. No other nations, for example, have taken the U.S. approach to data
privacy protection. See Mark Scott & Laurens Cerulus, Europe’s New Data
Protection Rules Export Privacy Standards Worldwide, POLITICO (Jan. 31, 2018
12:00 PM), https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-data-protection-privacy
-standards-gdpr-general-protection-data-regulation/
[https://perma.cc/85FRNP25] (describing the European Union’s data privacy standards as “de facto
global standards for most countries except for a few holdouts like China, Russia
and the United States.”).
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Information Security Public-Private Platform (NIS Platform)
takes a risk management approach, and specifically adopts the
NIST CSF core—identify, protect, detect, respond, recover—as
the industry-standard EU approach for cybersecurity policy.83
As such, this aspect of EU data governance underscores the
extent to which the transatlantic approach to both cybersecurity
and privacy is increasingly using both the language and tools of
risk management introduced above.
As with cybersecurity and information privacy generally,
the EU has long been engaged with IoT issues.84 For example,
the EU founded the Alliance for Internet of Things Innovation.85
The European Commission has also engaged internationally,
welcoming delegations from around the world to discuss IoT
governance,86 reinforcing the EU’s place as a leader for
cybersecurity and privacy governance. Finally, in late 2015 the
European Commission launched Horizon 2020, which included
goals for smart cities and IoT deployment,87 policies that are
further reinforced by the EU’s push to create a Digital Single
Market in Europe to support the estimated eleven-trillion-dollar

83. Compare NIS Platform (WG-1) Final Draft 220515, Network and
Information Security Risk Management Organisational Structures and
Requirements, 13–15 (available at https://resilience.enisa.europa.eu
/nis-platform/shared-documents/5th-plenary-meeting/chapter-1-nis-riskmanagement-organisational-structures-and-requirements-v2/at_download/file)
(considering the “Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover” model its
discussion of methods “to ensure effective risk management”), with NAT’L INST.
OF STANDARDS AND TECH supra note 53, at 6–7 (outlining the “Framework Core
Functions:” identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover). For more on this
topic, see Shackelford supra note 56.
84. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament,
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee
of the Regions, at 2–3, COM (2009) 278 final (June 18, 2009) (explaining that
adoption of IoT depends on privacy protections, as these protections are a
prerequisite for social acceptance).
85. The Alliance for Internet of Things Innovation (AIOTI), EUROPEAN
COMM’N (Aug. 2, 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/alliance
-internet-things-innovation-aioti.
86. Cf. Meeting with Brazilian Delegation, 28 May, AIOTI NEWS,
https://aioti.eu/meeting-with-brasilian-delegation-28-may/
(“Brazilian
delegation presented their IoT strategy and was interested in smart farming
and health. This exchange will be continued by AIOTI sending note with
proposals of concrete cooperation areas.”).
87. See European Commission Decision on Horizon 2020, O.J. C(2015) 6776
of 13 October 2015 (identifying five pilot areas including smart living as part of
a broader movement toward IoT development).
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economic impact of IoT applications by 2025.88 The latter is only
one component in the “Digitising European Industry” initiative,
which includes three pillars for IoT policy across the EU,
including: “a thriving IoT ecosystem; a human-centered IoT
approach; [and] a single market for IoT.”89 The proposed 2017
“European Data Economy” initiative would strengthen the move
toward a single market for IoT across Europe.90 In short, the EU
is balancing between an embrace of the IoT and the economic
opportunities it affords,91 while also taking proactive steps to
address its downsides, including by clarifying its own liability
regimes.92 These goals demonstrate how the EU is planning to
secure the full gamut of IoT devices, including those in the
manufacturing sector.
1. Impact of GDPR
A key aspect for how the EU will shape IoT governance is
through the GDPR, which is an extension of its long push to
create a Digital Single Market (DSM) introduced above.
Although most of the press coverage of the GDPR has focused on
its privacy protection regulations and the potentially very large
penalties that can be imposed for not following the data privacy
rules,93 an important goal of the GDPR is to tear down, to the

88. See, e.g., The Internet of Things, EUROPEAN COMM’N, https://
ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/internet-of-things (last updated Sept. 19,
2019) (discussing the single digital market); The 2019 State of IoT Report,
https://www.particle.io/solutions/2019-state-of-iot-report/
(last
PARTICLE,
visited Nov. 11, 2019) (proposing that “IoT will have a total potential economic
impact of up to $11.1 trillion a year by 2025.”).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., Research & Innovation in Internet of Things, EUROPEAN
COMMI’N (Aug. 22, 2019), https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en
/research-innovation-iot (identifying five IoT “large scale pilots” covering
relevant IoT areas).
92. See Liability for Emerging Digital Technologies 2 (Commission Staff
Working Document, Apr. 25, 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/digital-singlemarket/en/news/european-commission-staff-working-document-liabilityemerging-digital-technologies [https://perma.cc/RAT2-FU8U] (“[A] reflection on
future needs and developments is needed, not only from the perspective of the
victim i.e. in order to ensure equitable remedies, compensation and allocation
of responsibility, but also from the perspective of the innovators and companies
operating in the EU as legal certainty is a key element for good business
development.”).
93. See, e.g., Scott & Laurens, supra note 82.
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extent feasible, remaining regulatory walls between the EU
Member States and move toward a single EU market.94
Building from this foundation, GDPR is an expansive
regulatory regime with a wide array of requirements on covered
firms ranging from ensuring data portability and consent to
mandating that firms disclose a data breach within seventy-two
hours of a firm becoming aware of the incident and then
conducting a post-mortem to ensure that a similar scenario will
not recur.95 As groundbreaking as these regulations are, though,
they were not drafted with IoT in mind, despite a 2017 finding
by the European Union Agency for Network and Information
Security (ENISA) that there is “no level zero defined for the
security and privacy of connected and smart devices. . . .
[or] . . . legal guidelines for trust of IoT devices and services.”96
Further, European-level regulation is slow, and a blunt
instrument—GDPR, as one example, took more than four years
to be adopted after having been proposed in 2012.97
Microsoft has argued that for manufacturing firms at least,
“[t]he message is clear: manufacturers, even outside Europe,
need to consider their exposure under the GDPR and plan
accordingly.”98 More specifically, according to Olivier Van Hoof
of the data management firm Collibria:

94. See Digital Single Market: Bringing Down Barriers to Unlock Online
Opportunities, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, https://ec.europa.eu/commission
/priorities/digital-single-market_en (last visited Aug. 24, 2019) (explaining how
regulatory barriers must be removed in favor of a single market in order to
benefit from digital technologies most efficiently).
95. See Rita Heimes, Top 10 Operational Impacts of the GDPR: Part 1 –
Data Security and Breach Notification, INT’L ASSOC. PRIVACY PROF. (Jan. 6,
2016), https://iapp.org/news/a/top-10-operational-impacts-of-the-gdpr-part-1data-security-and-breach-notification/
[https://perma.cc/7E2B-TBDN]
(discussing how the GDPR raised standards of breach notifications).
96. Infineon – NXP – STMicroelectronics-ENISA Common Positon on
Cybersecurity 1 (Dec. 2016) https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa
-position-papers-and-opinions/infineon-nxp-st-enisa-position-on-cybersecurity.
97. See, e.g., Scott Gordon, Will We Get a GDPR for the IOT?, SC MAGAZINE
(Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.scmagazineuk.com/will-we-get-a-gdpr-for-the
-iot/article/758037/ (arguing that the industry should establish standards for
IoT security because regulation will not be enacted fast enough to address
rapidly-developing privacy issues).
98. Çağlayan Arkan, Achieving GDPR Compliance in Manufacturing,
MICROSOFT (Dec. 15, 2017), https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/industry
-blog/industry/manufacturing/achieving-gdpr-compliance-in-manufacturing/
[https://perma.cc/W2XR-JKCU].
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“[GDPR] has particular relevance for the manufacturing industry,
which is using AI and RFID [Radio Frequency Identification] to
collect, use and integrate personal information into product manufacturing. Through IoT and their quest to make better connections with end users, manufacturers are collecting more information about consumers. And we’ve seen a number of studies
indicating the manufacturing industry lags behind in cybersecurity. Therefore, specific safeguards should be established for these
newer forms of electronic communications and sharing of personal
data. And it shouldn’t be taken lightly. Regulators will issue significant fines for GDPR non-compliance, up to 2-4% of global revenue for non-compliance. The deadline for compliance . . . [was]
May 25, 2018.”99

As such, as with the California laws discussed above, the
global impact of GDPR on the manufacturing sector should not
be underestimated, and neither should the NIS Directive.
2. Applicability of NIS Directive to Smart Factories
Directives such as NIS have the benefit of providing more
freedom to nations to craft solutions to common problems, such
as the need for more robust critical infrastructure protection, but
this can similarly be a cumbersome process.100 However, these
directives risk sacrificing consistency across the EU, along with
the timeliness that is so critical in rapidly-evolving areas such
as IoT innovation.101 This author has argued that this “type of
active industry dialogue is a crucial piece of the NIST
Framework’s success—as well as that of the more general
bottom-up approach to cybersecurity regulation—in the United
States, and is one that other nations are seeking to emulate.”102
However, EU directives are unlike regulations in that they are
more nation-specific. Some variation is already apparent. For

99. Craig Guillot, What American Manufacturers Need to Know About New
Data Protection Laws in Europe, CHIEF EXEC. GRP. (May 31, 2017),
https://chiefexecutive.net/american-manufacturers-need-know-new-data
-protection-laws-europe/.
100. See Ian Wishart, EU Strikes Cybersecurity Deal to Make Companies
Boost Defenses, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 8, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news
/articles/2015-12-08/eu-strikes-cybersecurity-deal-to-make-companies-boostdefenses. (describing new EU rules that apply to all “critical operators” in
“energy, transport, health and banking.”).
101. See generally Applying EU Law, Eur. Comm’n https://ec.europa.eu/info
/law/law-making-process/applying-eu-law_en
[https://perma.cc/98ES-XJQE]
(last visited Jan. 10, 2019) (providing additional information on the distinction
between directives and regulations in the EU context).
102. Shackelford, Russell, & Haut, supra note 56, at 222–23.
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example, the French government is considering mandating
liability for security lapses on the part of IoT manufacturers.103
This is similar to the different approaches being taken by U.S.
states when it comes to IoT security.
C. APPLICABILITY OF BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY TO MANAGING
SUPPLY CHAIN RISKS
It is well-known that hackers can exploit vulnerabilities in
software such as by sending users virus-infected emails or
compromised links.104 It is less well-known that attackers can
also meddle with computers by altering the hardware on which
the software runs.105 These weaknesses are physical, and one
might think they are therefore easier to identify than spotting a
bug in millions of lines of code. In fact, they can be just as
difficult to locate, if not more so.106 As aforementioned, the
supply chains for many firms are complex and frequently span
dozens of jurisdictions and potentially hundreds of suppliers.
Apple’s iPhone, for example, relies on hundreds of suppliers from
around the world.107 Each of these steps in the manufacturing
process introduces opportunities for security problems to arise.
Recent research suggests that hackers could use smartphone
apps to damage manufacturing equipment, or even destroy
entire factories.108 While no such large-scale disaster has yet
taken place, even sophisticated retailers like Amazon have been

103. See Gordon, supra note 97.
104. See, e.g., Arun Vishwanath, ‘Spearphishing’ Roiled the Presidential
Campaign – Here’s How to Protect Yourself, CONVERSATION (Nov. 8, 2016),
https://theconversation.com/spearphishing-roiled-the-presidential-campaign
-heres-how-to-protect-yourself-68274.
105. See Andy Greenberg, This ‘Demonically Clever’ Backdoor Hides in a
Tiny Slice of a Computer Chip, WIRED (June 1, 2016), https://www.wired.com
/2016/06/demonically-clever-backdoor-hides-inside-computer-chip/.
106. Kaiyuan Yang et al., A2: Analog Malicious Hardware. IEEE, 23–25
May 2016 at 18. https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber
=7546493.
107. See, e.g., Ian Baker, The Global Supply Chain Behind the iPhone 6,
BETANEWS (2014), https://betanews.com/2014/09/23/the-global-supply-chain
-behind-the-iphone-6/.
108. See Martin Giles, Hackers Could Blow Up Factories Using Smartphone
Apps, MIT TECH. REV. (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com
/s/609946/hackers-could-blow-up-factories-using-smartphone-apps/ (describing
vulnerabilities in the control systems of some automated factories).
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fooled by counterfeit facsimiles of real products.109 Some supply
chain threats are more malicious. In 2012, Microsoft warned
customers that malware was being loaded onto computers made
in China “after they were shipped to a distributor.”110 Even
innocent motives may underlie serious problems. In 2015,
Lenovo installed advertising software on its computers, which
had the effect of dangerously weakening system security.111 It is
also distinctly possible that government actors could
compromise the supply chain for the purposes of espionage.112
These issues are particularly problematic in the IIoT context as
more technology is deployed in factories, expanding economic
opportunities as well as the attack surface that manufacturers
must defend.
One new way to help secure such complex supply chains
involves blockchain technology. The blockchain is a
decentralized database that can be stored and maintained across

109. See Ari Levy, Amazon’s Chinese Counterfeit Problem Is Getting Worse,
CNBC (July 8, 2016), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/07/08/amazons-chinesecounterfeit-problem-is-getting-worse.html (explaining that Amazon is not able
to combat the influx of Chinese counterfeit products. If Amazon is not able to
spot counterfeits, an industrial producer could be similarly fooled).
110. See Malware Being Installed on Computers in Supply Chain, Warns
Microsoft, GUARDIAN (Sept. 14, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/technology
/2012/sep/14/malware-installed-computers-factories-microsoft (describing an
incident in which malware was loaded onto hardware while still in the
distributor’s supply chain).
111. See Elizabeth Weise, FTC Settles with Lenovo Over a Built-In Snooping
Software, $3.5 Million Fine, USA TODAY (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.usatoday
.com/story/tech/2017/09/05/ftc-settles-lenovo-over-built-snooping
-software-scanned-users-computers/632775001/ [https://perma.cc/FD24-UD9K
] (Lenovo settled with the FTC regarding claims its laptops included
preinstalled software that could potentially be exploited to obtain users’
sensitive personal information); Joshua A.T. Fairfield, The ‘Internet of Things’
Is Sending Us Back to the Middle Ages, CONVERSATION (Sept. 5, 2017),
https://theconversation.com/the-internet-of-things-is-sending-us-back-to-the
-middle-ages-81435 (Lenovo’s software “hijacked web browsers’ traffic without
the user’s knowledge – including web communications users thought were
securely encrypted, like connections to banks and online stores for financial
transactions.”).
112. See, e.g., T.C. Sottek, NSA Reportedly Intercepting Laptops Purchased
Online to Install Spy Malware, VERGE (Dec. 29, 2013), https:
//www.theverge.com/2013/12/29/5253226/nsa-cia-fbi-laptop-usb-plant-spy
(claiming the NSA is able to intercept computers and use advanced hacking
tools to plant spy software without the owner’s permission or knowledge).
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myriad systems.113 Blockchain technology, for example, could be
used to track and verify the inputs into complicated supply
chains like Apple’s.114 Futurist Bernard Marr has argued that,
“[u]ltimately, blockchain can increase the efficiency and
transparency of supply chains and positively impact everything
from warehousing to delivery to payment. Chain of command is
essential for many things, and blockchain has the chain of
command built in.”115 The Australian car manufacturer Tomcar,
for example, pays its suppliers using Bitcoin.116 Major
multinational firms such as Unilever, Nestle, Tyson, Dole, and
Walmart already use blockchain applications to keep track of
food sources.117 However, no blockchain is immune to hacking.118
Policymakers around the world are taking a hard look at
appropriate blockchain regulations, with divergent approaches
being tried from Albany to Brussels.119
II. ROLE FOR POLICYMAKERS
Policymakers at the state and federal level can help
manufacturing firms better manage the multifaceted cyber
threat facing smart factories. This part discusses some available
reform options, beginning with civil society and insurance before
moving on to standards bodies and finally to an analysis of
pending bills before Congress and the importance of fostering
international dialogue.

113. See, e.g., Bernard Marr, How Blockchain Will Transform the Supply
Chain and Logistics Industry, FORBES (Mar. 23, 2018, 12:28 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/03/23/how-blockchain-will
-transform-the-supply-chain-and-logistics-industry/#1ebae465fecd (explaining
the benefits and uses of blockchain technology).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Marr, supra note 113.
117. Id.
118. See Edmund Lee, Why Blockchains Can Be Really Bad. Or: How
Techno-Futurists Can Ruin Things, RECODE (June 19, 2016), https://
www.recode.net/2016/6/19/11972818/dao-hacked-blockchain-ethereum
[https://perma.cc/GB7F-ZBYV] (describing how the Decentralized Autonomous
Organization, a democratically controlled investment group operated on the
blockchain, was hacked by exploiting vulnerabilities in its code).
119. See Scott J. Shackelford & Steve Myers, Block-by-Block: Leveraging the
Power of Blockchain Technology to Build Trust and Promote Cyber Peace, 19
YALE J. L. & TECH. 334, 366–69 (2017) (explaining differences in blockchain
regulatory schemes that governmental bodies have adopted).
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A. INSTILLING CYBERSECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT BEST
PRACTICES: A ROLE FOR INSURANCE?
Instead of top-down regulation, many, particularly in
industry, prefer self-regulation with the flexibility “to adapt to
rapid technological progress.”120 Such self-regulation has the
capacity to adapt better and faster than black letter law to
rapidly changing technological and social forces,121 though it is
certainly not without its problems.122 Consumer Reports is an
example of an organization that is trying to create such a
community. In March 2017, Consumer Reports launched its
Digital Standard, which is designed “to measure the privacy and
security of products, apps, and services.”123 Once it fully
matures, the Digital Standard could help empower consumers to
select products—including in the IoT context—that meet
rigorous privacy and security requirements. Of course,
Consumer Reports is not a regulatory organization, vendors will
still be legally able to sell products that do not meet the Digital
Standard. However, the Digital Standard might help the market
function more efficiently by rewarding those firms that take
cybersecurity and data privacy seriously and penalizing those
that do not through lower scores and, as a result, less revenue.
These efforts are already having an impact, the Digital Standard
was instrumental in exposing privacy risks in the fertility app
Glow.124 As the Digital Standard is continually refined and

120. MONROE E. PRICE
THE INTERNET 21 (2005).

& STEFAAN G. VERHULST, SELF-REGULATION AND

121. See id. at 21–22 (“[S]elf-regulation offers the benefits of greater
efficiency, increased incentives for compliance, and reduced cost.”).
122. See generally Elinor Ostrom, Polycentric Systems as One Approach for
Solving Collective-Action Problems 2–3 (Ind. Univ. Workshop in Political
Theory and Policy Analysis, Working Paper Series No. 08-6, 2008),
http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/handle/10535/4417/W08
-6_Ostrom_DLC.pdf (describing the advantages and disadvantages of
polycentric governance).
123. Consumer Reports Launches Digital Standard to Safeguard
Consumers’ Security and Privacy in Complex Marketplace, CONSUMER REP.
(Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.consumerreports.org/media-room/press-releases
/2017/03/consumer_reports_launches_digital_standard_to_safeguard_consume
rs_security_and_privacy_in_complex_marketplace/
[https://perma.cc/Y8SFB4QJ].
124. See Jerry Beilinson, Glow Pregnancy App Exposed Women to Privacy
Threats, Consumer Reports Finds, CONSUMER REP. (July 28, 2016),
https://www.consumerreports.org/mobile-security-software/glow-pregnancy
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globalized, as is happening now in dialogue with the EU, it will
likely further impact the trajectory and rate of global IoT privacy
and security standards, including those available to
manufacturers.125
The insurance industry is similarly helping to incentivize
the uptake of cybersecurity best practices. Chris Palmer, a
former Technology Director of the Electronic Frontiers
Foundation has called it a “key part of the [cybersecurity]
solution.”126 Although estimates vary,127 this market could be
worth more than $7.5 billion by 2020,128 and $23.07 billion by
2025.129 Regulatory developments, such as the Securities and
-app-exposed-women-to-privacy-threats/ (discussing various privacy concerns
in the Glow app, as well as Glow, Inc.’s efforts to address these concerns).
125. See Allen St. John, Europe’s GDPR Brings Data Portability to U.S.
Consumers, CONSUMER REP. (May 25, 2018), https://www.consumerreports.org
/privacy/gdpr-brings-data-portability-to-us-consumers/ (describing the likely
effect of the GDPR on U.S. consumers); Paul Hiebert, Consumer Reports in the
(Apr.
13,
2016),
Age
of
the
Amazon
Review,
ATLANTIC
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/04/consumer-reports-in
-the-age-of-the-amazon-review/477108/ (“More than 120 employees, with an
annual testing budget of approximately $25 million, evaluate some 3,000
products a year. The results of these impartial studies are then gathered,
examined, and published, ad-free, in Consumer Reports.”).
126. Interview with Chris Palmer, Google Eng’r and former Tech. Dir., Elec.
Frontiers Found., in S.F., Cal. (Feb. 25, 2011) (on file with the author).
127. See Nicole Perlroth, Insurance Against Cyber Attacks Expected to Boom,
N.Y. TIMES BITS (Dec. 23, 2011, 10:58 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com
/2011/12/23/insurance-against-cyber-attacks-expected-to-boom/ (noting that
“[t]here are no statistics on the size of the cyber insurance industry” and
discussing how the estimated “$750 million worth of premiums placed [in
2011] . . . could grow by 50 percent over the next 12 to 18 months.”); cf. Robert
Lemos, Should SMBs Invest in Cyber Risk Insurance?, DARK READING (Sept. 9,
2010, 5:09 PM), https://www.darkreading.com/should-smbs-invest-in-cyber
-risk-insurance/d/d-id/1134322 [https://perma.cc/4GFX-H4XV] (reporting that
in 2010 “companies will take out around $600 million in premiums for cyber
risk . . . .”).
128. See Jim Finkle, Cyber Insurance Premiums Rocket After High-Profile
Attacks, REUTERS (Oct. 12, 2015, 12:33 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article
/2015/10/12/us-cybersecurity-insurance-insight-idUSKCN0S609M20151012
(“[T]he cyber insurance market is set to triple to about $7.5 billion over the next
five years . . . .”); accord PWC, INSURANCE 2020 & BEYOND: REAPING THE
DIVIDENDS
OF
CYBER
RESILIENCE
10
(2015),
https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/insurance/publications/assets/reaping-dividends
-cyber-resilience.pdf (“We estimate that the cyber insurance market could grow
to . . . at least $7.5 billion by 2020.”).
129. See Global Cyber Security Insurance Market Size Forecast to Exceed
USD 20 Billion by 2025, ADROIT MARKET RESEARCH, (Apr. 6, 2019),
https://www.adroitmarketresearch.com/press-release/cyber-security
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Exchange Commission (SEC) cyber attack disclosure guidelines,
could reinforce this trend.130 Yet calculating cyber risk insurance
premiums is no simple feat given the paucity of reliable data.131
Even defining covered “cyber attacks” and cybersecurity best
practices can be difficult, though an insurance company might
use the NIST CSF and FTC guidelines discussed above as
helpful data points.132 Overall, the insurance industry could aid
in the process of boosting cybersecurity due diligence across the
economy, including in the manufacturing sector. Over time, such
efforts may improve the overall level of cybersecurity
preparedness of manufacturing firms, though it is important to
understand that such coverage is only part of the solution, and
that it is vital to review coverage terms lest patchy policies
contribute to an inaccurate and reactive mindset on the part of
covered firms.133
B. FEDERAL POLICY OPTIONS
An array of policy options are being discussed at the federal
level that would impact the growth and development of IIoT
applications. This section focuses on the most recent of these
efforts, including establishing baseline cybersecurity standards
through an IoT security bill, protecting consumer privacy
through a repackaged Privacy Bill of Rights, as well as

-insurance-market (“The global [c]yber security insurance market size was USD
3.89 billion in 2017 and is expected to grow to USD 23.07 billion in 2025 . . . .”).
See also 33.8%+ Growth for Cyber Insurance Market Size to 2024,
MARKETWATCH, (Feb. 8, 2019, 11:22 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/
press-release/338-growth-for-cyber-insurance-market-size-to-2024-2019-02-08
(“[T]he Cyber Insurance . . . global market size will reach US[D]16700 million
by 2024 . . . .”).
130. See Perlroth, supra note 127 (attributing the anticipated growth in
cyber insurance premiums to the 2010 SEC disclosure guidance, among other
factors).
131. Cf. Sarah Veysey, Insurers Urge Anonymous Database to Help
(May
23,
2016),
http://
Underwrite
Cyber
Risks,
BUS. INS.
www.businessinsurance.com/article/20160523/NEWS06/160529961
(“The
Association of British Insurers has called for a national anonymous database of
cyber incidents to enable the insurance market to better assess, underwrite and
price cyber risks.”).
132. See supra Section 1(A)(3).
133. See, e.g., Scott Shackelford, Should Your Firm Invest in Cyber Risk
Insurance?, 55 BUS. HORIZONS 349, 353–55 (2012) (noting cyber insurance
policies “could contribute to a more reactive focus maintaining the suboptimal
cybersecurity status quo.”).
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encouraging proactive cybersecurity measures through allowing
limited active defense.
1. Codifying Cybersecurity Baselines: Proposed IoT Security
Bill
Senators Mark Warner, Cory Gardner, Ron Wyden, and
Steve Daines introduced the IoT Cybersecurity Act of 2017 with
this aim in mind.134 In brief, the legislation would require
vendors who sell products to the U.S. government to: (1) ensure
that their devices “are patchable,” (2) that they do not “contain
known vulnerabilities,” (3) that they “rely on standard
protocols,” and (4) they “don’t contain hard-coded passwords.”135
However, the bill does not take a one-size-fits-all approach to
regulating an area as vast as IoT. Indeed, the authors provide a
path forward whereby, if industry provides “equivalent, or more
rigorous, device security requirements” then they may be
utilized in lieu of the foregoing.136 The legislative effort has a
long list of proponents from Bruce Schneier and Professor
Jonathan Zittrain to leading voices from Symantec and the
Center for Democracy and Technology,137 but also has its share
of critics.138 This bill has still not become law as of 2019, so
perhaps other alternatives should be considered.139 These
alternatives include the Internet of Things Cybersecurity
134. See generally S. 1691, 115th Cong. pmbl., § 1 (2017) (providing for
“minimal cybersecurity operational standards for [i]nternet-connected devices
purchased by Federal agencies, and for other purposes.”). In 2019 a modified
version of the bill was reintroduced by the same sponsors. Internet of Things
(IoT) Cybersecurity Act, S. 734, 116th Cong. (2019).
135. MARK WARNER ET AL., INTERNET OF THINGS CYBERSECURITY
IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 2017 FACT SHEET
1
(2017),
https://
www.warner.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/8/6/861d66b8-93bf-4c93-84d06bea67235047/8061BCEEBF4300EC702B4E894247D0E0.iot-cybesecurityimprovement-act---fact-sheet.pdf.
136. Id.
137. See id. at 2.
138. See Brian Krebs, New Bill Seeks Basic IoT Security Standards, KREBS
ON SEC. (Aug. 1, 2017), https://krebsonsecurity.com/2017/08/new-bill-seeks
-basic-iot-security-standards/ [https://perma.cc/C238-TE8N] (criticizing the bill
for “exempt[ing] cybersecurity researchers engaging in good-faith research from
liability under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act when in engaged in research pursuant to adopted coordinated
vulnerability disclosure guidelines.”).
139. See S. 1691: Internet of Things (IoT) Cybersecurity Improvement Act of
2017 Track S. 1691, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/115
/s1691 (last visited Dec. 20, 2019).
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Improvement Act of 2019, which calls upon NIST and the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) to “leverage Federal
Government procurement power to encourage increased
cybersecurity for Internet of Things devices.”140
2. Protecting Consumer Privacy: Privacy Bill of Rights
There are proposals at the federal level, similar to
California’s 2018 Consumer Privacy Act. These proposals seek
to codify some of the protections similar to the protections in the
GDPR, discussed above. This Privacy Bill of Rights, a version of
which was first trumpeted by the Obama Administration in
2012, was part of the CONSENT (Consumer Online Notification
for Stopping Edge-provider Network Transgressions) Act
introduced by Senate Democrats in 2018 in the wake of the
Cambridge Analytica scandal.141 If enacted, the law would
require covered firms “to obtain opt-in consent from users before
sharing, selling or otherwise using their personal
information . . . [along with] develop[ing] reasonable data
security practices.”142 It would impact manufacturers directly
since its cybersecurity and data processing requirements would
apply not just to social networks, but to an array of publicly
traded firms including those deploying IIoT tech.143

140. Micha Nandaraj Gallo, Senate Reintroduces IoT Cybersecurity
Improvement Act, INSIDE PRIVACY (Mar. 12, 2019), https://www.insideprivacy
.com/internet-of-things/senate-reintroduces-iot-cybersecurity-improvementact/.
141. See Marguerite Reardon, Senate Dems Introduce ‘Privacy Bill of
Rights,’ CNET (Apr. 10, 2018 11;58 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/senate
-dems-introduce-privacy-bill-of-rights/ (describing the CONSENT Act
introduced to “establish privacy protections for people who use online platforms,
like Facebook and Google.”).
142. Id.
143. See S. 2639, 115th Cong. (2017) (the bill applies to all providers of “edge
services” defined within the bill as services provided over the internet which
require a subscription “through which a program searches for and identifies
items in a database that correspond to keywords or characters specified by the
customer” which could conceivably affect many manufacturers).
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3. Fostering Proactive Cybersecurity: Active Defense Bill
In 2018, Congress considered a wide range of cybersecurity
legislation from a privacy bill of rights144 to election security.145
Relevant to this discussion, they also considered a version of the
Active Cyber Defense Certainty (ACDC) Act.146 The ACDC Act147
would permit firms to operate beyond their network perimeter,
including the potential to conduct surveillance on entities “who
are thought to have done hacking in the past or who, according
to a tip or some other intelligence, are planning an attack.”148
The bill also clarifies “the type of tools and techniques that
defenders can use that exceed the boundaries of their own
computer network.”149 In summary, according to Congressman
Graves, “[t]his is an effort to give the private sector the tools they
need to defend themselves.”150 If enacted, such a policy would
allow manufacturers to potentially target foreign sponsors of
cyber attacks.151
144. See Press Release, Ed Markey, U.S. Senator for Mass., As Facebook
CEO Zuckerberg Testifies to Congress, Senators Markey and Blumenthal
Introduce Privacy Bill of Rights (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.markey.senate.gov
/news/press-releases/as-facebook-ceo-zuckerberg-testifies-to-congress-senators
-markey-and-blumenthal-introduce-privacy-bill-of-rights (aiming to “protect
the personal information of American consumers”). Specifically, Markey and
Blumenthal introduced the bill to: “Require[] edge providers to obtain opt-in
consent from users to use, share, or sell users’ personal information[,] . . . to
develop reasonable data security practices[,] . . . to notify users about all
collection, use, and sharing of users’ personal information[,] . . . [and] to notify
users in the event of a breach[.]” Id.
145. See Martin Matishak, Lawmakers Gather Behind Election Security Bill
— At Last, POLITICO (Mar. 22, 2018, 10:42AM), https://www.politico.com/story
/2018/03/22/election-security-bill-congress-437472 (describing congressional
efforts to pass the Secure Elections Act).
146. Active Cyber Defense Certainty Act, H.R. 4036, 115th Cong. (2017).
147. Id. See, e.g., Patrick Howell O’Neill, Rep. Graves: ‘Active Defense’ Bill
Will Launch a New Industry, CYBERSCOOP (Nov. 27, 2017),
https://www.cyberscoop.com/tom-graves-active-defense-hack-back-bill-new
-industry/ (reporting that the bill attracted both support and criticism).
148. Nicholas Schmidle, The Digital Vigilantes Who Hack Back, NEW
YORKER (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www. newyorker.com/magazine/2018/05/07/the
-digital-vigilantes-who-hack-back.
149. H.R. 4036, 115th Cong. § 2(11) (2017).
150. Schmidle, supra note 148.
151. See Tom Kulik, Why the Active Cyber Defense Certainty Act Is a Bad
Idea, ABOVE THE LAW (Jan. 29, 2018, 17:30 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/
2018/01/why-the-active-cyber-defense-certainty-act-is-a-bad-idea/
[https://perma.cc/4L37-UCMG] (noting that the ACDC Act would allow a
company to defend against attackers including those outside the United States).
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Concerns regarding the ACDC act, though, fall across
several dimensions. Some, such as former National Security
Agency Directors Admiral Michael S. Rogers and Keith
Alexander, are concerned about further complicating an already
complex cyber threat landscape.152 Others, such as Rob Joyce,
President Trump’s cybersecurity adviser, are more concerned
about sanctioning “vigilantism” which could, he argued, even in
a best-case scenario, lead to “unqualified actors bringing risk to
themselves, their targets, and their governments.”153 A new
version of the Act was introduced in 2019.154
In general, there is a growing consensus that firms should
practice passive defense best practices,155 and not “hacking back”
to recover assets due to serious concerns regarding attribution
and escalation.156
C. GOVERNING SMART FACTORIES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR
NORMS DEVELOPMENT
There are many ways to conceptualize cybersecurity policy
in the IIoT context, but among them is the dynamic field of
polycentric governance.157 As this author has described it
previously, this governance framework may be considered to be
a multi-level, multi-purpose, multi-functional, and multisectoral model,158 championed by numerous scholars including

152. See Schmidle, supra note 148.
153. Id.
154. Active Cyber Defense Certainty Act, H.R. 3270, 116th Cong. (2019). See
Robert Chesney, Hackback Is Back: Assessing the Active Cyber Defense
(June
14,
2019),
https://
Certainty
Act,
LAWFARE
www.lawfareblog.com/hackback-back-assessing-active-cyber-defensecertaintyact [https://perma.cc/MA45-KWC3] (explaining the new version’s provisions).
155. See id. at 9 fig. 1 (illustrating the spectrum of cyber defense).
156. See id. at 5 (explaining the unintended consequences of certain active
cyber defense measures).
157. Michael D. McGinnis, An Introduction to IAD and the Language of the
Ostrom Workshop: A Simple Guide to a Complex Framework, 39 POL’Y STUD. J.
169, 171 (2011) (defining polycentricity as “a system of governance in which
authorities from overlapping jurisdictions (or centers of authority) interact to
determine the conditions under which these authorities, as well as the citizens
subject to these jurisdictional units, are authorized to act as well as the
constraints put upon their activities for public purposes.”).
158. See id. at 171–72 (explaining the characteristics of polycentric
governance).

34

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 21:1

Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom and Professor Vincent Ostrom.159
It “challenges orthodoxy [in part] by demonstrating the benefits
of self-organization and networking regulations ‘at multiple
scales.’”160 Rather than attempting a unitary response to
managing “global collective action problems,”161 such as cyberattacks, a polycentric approach “recognizes that diverse
organizations working at multiple levels can create different
types of policies that can increase levels of cooperation and
compliance, enhancing ‘flexibility across issues and adaptability
over time.’”162 This, in other words, envisions an all-of-the-above
approach that harnesses positive network effects that could, in
time, result in the emergence of a “norm cascade” improving
smart factory security.163 Moreover, the various analytical tools
developed to help measure and implement the findings from the
polycentric governance literature, including the Ostrom Design
Principles and the Institutional Analysis and Development
(IAD) Framework,164 may help create an analytical guide for
smart factories to identify governance gaps.165
One example of a successful public-private polycentric
collaboration is the NIST CSF, which, as has been noted, is now

159. See Elinor Ostrom, Polycentric Systems as One Approach for Solving
Collective-Action Problems 1 (Ind. Univ. Workshop in Political Theory and
Policy Analysis, Working Paper No. 08–6, 2008), http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu
/dlc/bitstream/handle/10535/4417/W08-6_Ostrom_DLC.pdf (reviewing “studies
of polycentric governance systems in metropolitan areas and for managing
common-pool resources.”).
160. See Scott J. Shackelford, Toward Cyberpeace: Managing Cyber Attacks
Through Polycentric Governance, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1273, 1283 (2013).
161. Elinor Ostrom, A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate
Change, 15 ANNALS ECON. & FIN. 97, 97 (2014).
162. Shackelford, supra note 160, at 1284 (quoting Robert O. Keohane &
David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Climate Change, 9 PERSP. ON POL. 7,
9 (2011)); cf. Julia Black, Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and
Accountability in Polycentric Regulatory Regimes, 2 REG. & GOVERNANCE 137,
157 (2008) (discussing the legitimacy of polycentric regimes and arguing that
“[a]ll regulatory regimes are polycentric to varying degrees[.]”).
163. Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics
and Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887, 895 (1998); see id. at 895–99
(explaining the three-stage norm life cycle including “norm emergence,” “norm
cascade,” and “norm internalization”).
164. See generally Elinor Ostrom, Background on the Institutional Analysis
and Development Framework, 39 POL’Y STUD. J. 7 (2011).
165. For more on this topic, see SCOTT J. SHACKELFORD & AMANDA N. CRAIG
DECKARD, THE INTERNET OF EVERYTHING: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW
(forthcoming 2019).
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going global.166 The success of such frameworks, civil society
efforts like the Consumer Reports Digital Standard,167 and
regional regimes like the EU General Data Protection
Regulation,168 is part and parcel of the literature on polycentric
governance given the extent to which it leverages selforganization while also recognizing the need for a coordinating
function between disparate groups and governance scales.169
However, it is important to note that not all polycentric systems
are guaranteed to be successful. Disadvantages, for example, can
include gridlock and a lack of defined hierarchy.170 The Ostrom
Design Principles referenced above can help predict the
institutional success of given interventions.171 Still, the
literature remains immature, as does the current state of IoT
governance. In fact, the ISACA, previously known as the
Information Systems Audit and Control Association,172 surveyed
IT professionals in the United Kingdom and found that “75
percent of the security experts polled say they do not believe
device manufacturers are implementing sufficient security
measures in IoT devices, and a further 73 percent say existing
security standards in the industry do not sufficiently address IoT
specific security concerns.”173

166. See NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., supra note 53 (introducing and
explaining the framework).
167. See Press Release, Consumer Reports, Consumer Reports Launches
Digital Standard to Safeguard Consumers’ Security and Privacy in Complex
Marketplace (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.consumerreports.org/mediaroom/press-releases/2017/03/consumer_reports_launches_digital_standard
_to_safeguard_consumers_security_and_privacy_in_complex_marketplace/
(introducing the Digital Standard).
168. Commission Regulation 2016/679 of Apr. 27, 2016, General Data
Protection Regulation, 2016 O.J. (L 119).
169. See generally Ostrom, supra note 159 (“Solving collective-action
problems requires opening public and private spheres of activities ranging from
the small to the very large so as to encourage effective problem solving.”).
170. See Robert O. Keohane & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for
Climate Change, 9 PERSP. ON POL. 7, 15 (2011) (“Components may conflict with
one another in ways that yield gridlock rather than innovation; the lack of
hierarchy among specific regimes can create critical veto points. . . .”).
171. See generally Shackelford et al., supra note 8.
172. About ISACA, ISACA, http://www.isaca.org/about-isaca/Pages
/default.aspx (last visited Dec. 20, 2019).
173. Existing Security Standards Do Not Sufficiently Address IoT, HELP NET
SECURITY (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.net-security.org/secworld.php?id=18981
[https://perma.cc/SXZ2-KX32].
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Manufacturing firms should engage in these conversations.
Manufacturing firms have already made considerable progress
in making attacks on civilian critical infrastructure, including
smart factories, off limits. They have also made considerable
investments in both security and privacy by design, but they can
go farther by refining the scope. This involves further refining
the scope of cybersecurity due diligence at the international
level, as well as boosting public-private information sharing, and
even recasting the cybersecurity debate in the manufacturing
sector as not just an exercise in cost-benefit analysis, but as a
corporate social responsibility. Firms could build from this
conception by participating in communities to help spread this
approach, such as through the Cybersecurity Tech Accord,174
and the Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace.175
CONCLUSION
As the IoT matures, and more things and organizations are
connected, there is a potential to build smart (and potentially
more resilient) things, factories, and societies. Smart factories
and their impacts span myriad sectors and industries. In
response, polycentric IoT governance systems should be
leveraged to improve critical infrastructure security and protect
consumer privacy.176 This includes frameworks and standards—
including an NIST IoT-specific effort—along with the Consumer
Reports Digital Standard, and the use of corporate governance
structures, such as sustainability, and international norms,
including due diligence. Such an “all-of-the-above” polycentric
approach is essential to addressing governance gaps in smart
factories as part of improving security and data privacy in the
ever-expanding Internet of Everything.

174. See James Sanders, Cybersecurity Tech Accord Sets New Privacy
Standards for Tech Companies, TECHREPUBLIC. (Apr. 18, 2018),
https://www.techrepublic.com/article/cybersecurity-tech-accord-sets-new
-privacy-standards-for-tech-companies/.
175. See Louise Matsakis, The US Sits out an International Cybersecurity
Agreement, WIRED (Nov. 12, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/paris-callcybersecurity-united-states-microsoft/ [https://perma.cc/GXD5-B9LK].
176. See Shackelford, supra note 160 at 1286.

